I read the piece carefully and appreciate both the effort and the thought that went into it. Your use of fWAR is very helpful as a description of what has happened to this club. I am less certain about how well it serves as a leading indicator, but it clearly illustrates the lack of impact performances and the shortage of 2+ WAR players.
One thing your work made me wonder is whether moving productive players such as Weaver at the deadline only worsens the problem by removing one of the few consistent producers from the roster. Your analysis may argue as strongly for preserving some of the current core as it does for selling it.
The Weaver question is hard for me. As strictly a fan who watches the games, I don't want to trade Weaver because he's really good and he's under contract for next year, too.
But if you go beyond being a fan and think about putting together the best team possible - Weaver could very possibly get you something more valuable in return. This season is shot, it probably doesn't factor much into the decision on whether or not to trade him.
Do any of us as individuals feel confident that Stearns will get maximum value in a Weaver deal? That will vary from person to person. Regardless, if Stearns could flip Weaver for someone who could deliver a 2.5 fWAR season in the near future - he should do it. But those guys don't exactly grow on trees.
Brian, I think we are largely agreeing. The difference is where we each set the bar.
Even if Stearns could acquire prospects with a high probability of producing 2.0 fWAR in 2027, I would still hesitate.
Trading Weaver is not simply subtracting projected WAR. It is subtracting a core piece of the bullpen, the clubhouse, the dugout, and the culture that develops over six months and carries into the following season. Chemistry is not everything, but neither is it nothing.
Here we have an ideal reliever who is under contract for next season. The Mets would not only have to replace his innings, they would have to replace his role. He has closed successfully, succeeded in New York, can handle either the eighth or ninth inning, and provides confidence to the entire pitching staff.
With Minter likely gone, removing Weaver creates another major need. The Mets already lack upper-level pitching depth, so there is no obvious internal replacement.
That matters because Devin Williams, while talented, is not the same kind of lock-down late-inning answer as Jhoan Duran or Raisel Iglesias, nor do the Mets have anything close to the Dodgers' collection of late-inning options. Williams has had periods of inconsistency and, like every reliever, carries injury risk. Trading Weaver is not dealing from surplus; it is creating another hole where there is already very little margin for error.
That is why Weaver's value exceeds his fWAR. He is a trusted late-inning arm, a proven closer, a stabilizing presence for the pitching staff, and a known commodity under contract for another season.
Prospects, even highly regarded ones, remain projections.
Because of all those factors—clubhouse leadership, bullpen stability, success in New York, contractual control through next season, versatility in high-leverage situations, and the difficulty of replacing his role—it would take a substantial offer for me to move him.
Like you, I would absolutely fish around the league. But I would not stop at looking for a projected 2.0-fWAR player. I would be searching for someone with legitimate athletic upside to become an elite player. Even if that player filled a position the Mets already had covered, an elite young major leaguer or elite prospect is a valuable asset that can always be flipped during the offseason to address another need.
I would proactively identify those ideal targets, run them through the collaborative front office, ownership, scouts, and outside evaluators, and pursue a deal only if there were broad agreement that it materially increased the Mets' chances of winning a future World Series—not merely the long-term asset value of the return on paper.
"To defeat a healthy Dodgers club featuring Ohtani, Yamamoto, Glasnow, Snell, Betts, Freeman, Smith, Edman, Hernández, Hernández, Muncy, Pages, Sasaki, veteran relievers with championship experience, productive rookies, and one of baseball's strongest farm systems, perhaps difficult decisions regarding the existing Mets core after 2025 were unavoidable."
— • — • —
Personally, I tend to focus primarily on identifying elite players. I also like listening to people like Brian on concurrent strategies.
That said, in my experience, I have rarely seen championship teams sustain success without enough elite talent: physical gifts, work ethic, mental processes, visualization, the ability not to dwell on past failures, and the discipline to keep improving.
Management also has to do more than simply bring the same team back one year older. It has to work to lower the average age, because after players win their first championship, motivation can change. As players age, injury risk also rises. Even without a major injury history, the risk increases over time.
That is why teams need to keep adding new elite players with some of those same intangibles — players who can offset reduced hunger for a second ring, higher injury risk, and the reality that every other club is trying to knock them off.
Recent Dodgers teams often add two or three new elite players after a championship. Looking at organizations that repeat or return to the World Series within a few years, that pattern appears frequently. The Dodgers use players who may be replaced to acquire prospects. They draft well, develop well, and trade prospects for prospects.
Operating in Southern California, where baseball is virtually a 12-month sport, with countless junior colleges, developmental programs, and late bloomers, gives the Dodgers advantages beyond payroll alone. The Diamondbacks, Padres, and Angels benefit from that environment as well.
Today, according to one major publication, the Dodgers have two of the top 11 prospects in baseball and three of the top 19. The Mets have Jonah Tong at No. 82 as their lone Top 100 prospect.
But that also raises a fair question about David Stearns. He may not have built a contender yet, but he also may not have inherited one. With only two drafts, an underdeveloped farm system, an aging major-league core, and pressure to remain competitive immediately, he may have been trying to solve problems that had been years in the making.
If Stearns concluded that the Mets could not realistically win by committing five additional years to Nimmo and Alonso while also carrying McNeil and Díaz, then some of his decisions become more understandable. That does not make the results good.
It does suggest that the criticism should be more precise.
Perhaps the problem is not that every individual decision failed. The problem may be that the roster required too many favorable outcomes at the same time. When several players underperformed or were injured, there was insufficient elite talent and insufficient depth to absorb those losses.
If that is the case, then perhaps the question is not whether Stearns has failed, but whether any general manager, given this inherited roster, two drafts, and this farm system, could reasonably have constructed a team capable of beating the Dodgers in a postseason series.
To defeat a healthy Dodgers club featuring Ohtani, Yamamoto, Glasnow, Snell, Betts, Freeman, Smith, Edman, Hernández, Hernández, Muncy, Pages, Sasaki, veteran relievers with championship experience, productive rookies, and one of baseball's strongest farm systems, perhaps difficult decisions regarding the existing Mets core after 2025 were unavoidable.
If so, then the organization may still be in the middle of a transition rather than at the end of one.
Months ago I suggested a Houston Astros tear down and rebuild when they struggled with the new additions not panning out. In theory Stearns trades might have worked had the new players just hit and produced runs. Then we could have accepted their advanced bat on ball skills versus the power they gave up, and even ignored the lack of run prevention at the infield corner positions. The core of this team includes rookies Benge and Ewing, along with vets Soto, Lindor and Alvarez, who is certainly a player when healthy. That’s it. Poor depth, not quite ready prospects, and questionable new coaching has taken this team from a contender to a bottom feeder. And, the players they really need to move have tough contracts for other teams to take on, without the Mets swallowing big portions. Still shocked at how far they have fallen so fast.
Dawid, enjoy your comments, you should be writing for this blog!
Excellent work, Brian.
I read the piece carefully and appreciate both the effort and the thought that went into it. Your use of fWAR is very helpful as a description of what has happened to this club. I am less certain about how well it serves as a leading indicator, but it clearly illustrates the lack of impact performances and the shortage of 2+ WAR players.
One thing your work made me wonder is whether moving productive players such as Weaver at the deadline only worsens the problem by removing one of the few consistent producers from the roster. Your analysis may argue as strongly for preserving some of the current core as it does for selling it.
The Weaver question is hard for me. As strictly a fan who watches the games, I don't want to trade Weaver because he's really good and he's under contract for next year, too.
But if you go beyond being a fan and think about putting together the best team possible - Weaver could very possibly get you something more valuable in return. This season is shot, it probably doesn't factor much into the decision on whether or not to trade him.
Do any of us as individuals feel confident that Stearns will get maximum value in a Weaver deal? That will vary from person to person. Regardless, if Stearns could flip Weaver for someone who could deliver a 2.5 fWAR season in the near future - he should do it. But those guys don't exactly grow on trees.
Brian, I think we are largely agreeing. The difference is where we each set the bar.
Even if Stearns could acquire prospects with a high probability of producing 2.0 fWAR in 2027, I would still hesitate.
Trading Weaver is not simply subtracting projected WAR. It is subtracting a core piece of the bullpen, the clubhouse, the dugout, and the culture that develops over six months and carries into the following season. Chemistry is not everything, but neither is it nothing.
Here we have an ideal reliever who is under contract for next season. The Mets would not only have to replace his innings, they would have to replace his role. He has closed successfully, succeeded in New York, can handle either the eighth or ninth inning, and provides confidence to the entire pitching staff.
With Minter likely gone, removing Weaver creates another major need. The Mets already lack upper-level pitching depth, so there is no obvious internal replacement.
That matters because Devin Williams, while talented, is not the same kind of lock-down late-inning answer as Jhoan Duran or Raisel Iglesias, nor do the Mets have anything close to the Dodgers' collection of late-inning options. Williams has had periods of inconsistency and, like every reliever, carries injury risk. Trading Weaver is not dealing from surplus; it is creating another hole where there is already very little margin for error.
That is why Weaver's value exceeds his fWAR. He is a trusted late-inning arm, a proven closer, a stabilizing presence for the pitching staff, and a known commodity under contract for another season.
Prospects, even highly regarded ones, remain projections.
Because of all those factors—clubhouse leadership, bullpen stability, success in New York, contractual control through next season, versatility in high-leverage situations, and the difficulty of replacing his role—it would take a substantial offer for me to move him.
Like you, I would absolutely fish around the league. But I would not stop at looking for a projected 2.0-fWAR player. I would be searching for someone with legitimate athletic upside to become an elite player. Even if that player filled a position the Mets already had covered, an elite young major leaguer or elite prospect is a valuable asset that can always be flipped during the offseason to address another need.
I would proactively identify those ideal targets, run them through the collaborative front office, ownership, scouts, and outside evaluators, and pursue a deal only if there were broad agreement that it materially increased the Mets' chances of winning a future World Series—not merely the long-term asset value of the return on paper.
"To defeat a healthy Dodgers club featuring Ohtani, Yamamoto, Glasnow, Snell, Betts, Freeman, Smith, Edman, Hernández, Hernández, Muncy, Pages, Sasaki, veteran relievers with championship experience, productive rookies, and one of baseball's strongest farm systems, perhaps difficult decisions regarding the existing Mets core after 2025 were unavoidable."
— • — • —
Personally, I tend to focus primarily on identifying elite players. I also like listening to people like Brian on concurrent strategies.
That said, in my experience, I have rarely seen championship teams sustain success without enough elite talent: physical gifts, work ethic, mental processes, visualization, the ability not to dwell on past failures, and the discipline to keep improving.
Management also has to do more than simply bring the same team back one year older. It has to work to lower the average age, because after players win their first championship, motivation can change. As players age, injury risk also rises. Even without a major injury history, the risk increases over time.
That is why teams need to keep adding new elite players with some of those same intangibles — players who can offset reduced hunger for a second ring, higher injury risk, and the reality that every other club is trying to knock them off.
Recent Dodgers teams often add two or three new elite players after a championship. Looking at organizations that repeat or return to the World Series within a few years, that pattern appears frequently. The Dodgers use players who may be replaced to acquire prospects. They draft well, develop well, and trade prospects for prospects.
Operating in Southern California, where baseball is virtually a 12-month sport, with countless junior colleges, developmental programs, and late bloomers, gives the Dodgers advantages beyond payroll alone. The Diamondbacks, Padres, and Angels benefit from that environment as well.
Today, according to one major publication, the Dodgers have two of the top 11 prospects in baseball and three of the top 19. The Mets have Jonah Tong at No. 82 as their lone Top 100 prospect.
But that also raises a fair question about David Stearns. He may not have built a contender yet, but he also may not have inherited one. With only two drafts, an underdeveloped farm system, an aging major-league core, and pressure to remain competitive immediately, he may have been trying to solve problems that had been years in the making.
If Stearns concluded that the Mets could not realistically win by committing five additional years to Nimmo and Alonso while also carrying McNeil and Díaz, then some of his decisions become more understandable. That does not make the results good.
It does suggest that the criticism should be more precise.
Perhaps the problem is not that every individual decision failed. The problem may be that the roster required too many favorable outcomes at the same time. When several players underperformed or were injured, there was insufficient elite talent and insufficient depth to absorb those losses.
If that is the case, then perhaps the question is not whether Stearns has failed, but whether any general manager, given this inherited roster, two drafts, and this farm system, could reasonably have constructed a team capable of beating the Dodgers in a postseason series.
To defeat a healthy Dodgers club featuring Ohtani, Yamamoto, Glasnow, Snell, Betts, Freeman, Smith, Edman, Hernández, Hernández, Muncy, Pages, Sasaki, veteran relievers with championship experience, productive rookies, and one of baseball's strongest farm systems, perhaps difficult decisions regarding the existing Mets core after 2025 were unavoidable.
If so, then the organization may still be in the middle of a transition rather than at the end of one.
Months ago I suggested a Houston Astros tear down and rebuild when they struggled with the new additions not panning out. In theory Stearns trades might have worked had the new players just hit and produced runs. Then we could have accepted their advanced bat on ball skills versus the power they gave up, and even ignored the lack of run prevention at the infield corner positions. The core of this team includes rookies Benge and Ewing, along with vets Soto, Lindor and Alvarez, who is certainly a player when healthy. That’s it. Poor depth, not quite ready prospects, and questionable new coaching has taken this team from a contender to a bottom feeder. And, the players they really need to move have tough contracts for other teams to take on, without the Mets swallowing big portions. Still shocked at how far they have fallen so fast.
Dawid, enjoy your comments, you should be writing for this blog!